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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 19-1854
________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
EDWIN VAQUIZ,
Appellant
________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 4-16-cr-00310-001)
District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann
________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
April 14, 2020
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 22, 2020)
________________
OPINION*
________________
AMBRO, Circuit Judge

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Edwin Vaquiz appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion to suppress
physical evidence of 280 bags of heroin seized in the search incident to his arrest and its
denial of his request for a jury instruction for the lesser-included-offense charge of simple
possession under 21 U.S.C. § 844. For the reasons below, we affirm both decisions of
the District Court. 1
I.
In January 2016, law enforcement for the Borough of Berwick began working
with J.F., a confidential informant who, facing charges related to lying on a permit to
purchase a firearm, sought to assist the authorities to receive positive consideration for
her case. She also had a criminal history that included prior convictions for theft by
deception and possession of narcotics. J.F. informed the authorities that she knew a drug
user named T.L. who could supply her with heroin; the officers already knew T.L. to be a
“middle-man” for drug transactions and, accordingly, thought she could lead them to a
source of supply.
On the basis of that information, Detectives Greg Martin, Scott Sienkiewicz, and
Brandon Schultz arranged a controlled heroin purchase for January 22, 2016, whereby
J.F. would go to T.L.’s residence and give her money the officers had provided in
exchange for heroin. The officers searched J.F.’s person and vehicle to ensure that she
did not have any contraband or additional money beforehand, and kept her under constant
surveillance during the entire transaction. J.F. met T.L. at her residence and gave her the
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The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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money; they then drove to another residence, which the officers recognized as belonging
to Vaquiz (as they had previously arrested him there), in order to obtain the heroin. The
officers established multiple lines of sight and Detective Martin saw Vaquiz leaving the
residence while Detective Schultz observed him meeting with J.F. and T.L. After the
meeting, J.F. dropped T.L. off at her residence and returned to the police station where
she handed over five packets of drugs stamped “Black Jack” that field tested positive for
heroin.2 J.F. gave a statement to the officers about the transaction in which she orally
confirmed what the officers had observed, and the officers once again searched her
person and car, finding no additional contraband.
Several days later, J.F. informed the officers that T.L. had told her that Vaquiz
planned to travel to Philadelphia to obtain a new supply of heroin. The officers formed a
plan and instructed J.F. to drive Vaquiz to Philadelphia in exchange for heroin. The next
day, January 29, 2016, J.F. picked up Vaquiz and drove him, along with T.L., to
Philadelphia, stopping at an ATM on the way so that Vaquiz could pick up cash. The
officers again searched J.F. beforehand and followed her most of the way to Philadelphia.
J.F. later testified that, while in Philadelphia, she witnessed Vaquiz meet with a supplier
who provided him with two packages—one large, one small. Officer Schultz was in
communication with J.F. the entire time and told her to text him when they were ten
minutes away from Berwick and, when they arrived, to park at a certain gas station and
enter the store. J.F. did as instructed, and officers swarmed the vehicle, removing Vaquiz
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A later lab test revealed the packets contained fentanyl, another opioid controlled
substance, instead of heroin.
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and T.L. from the car and placing Vaquiz under arrest. Officer Schultz then conducted a
search incident to arrest and seized a wrapped package containing 280 bags of suspected
heroin; he then located 28 additional bags beneath the back seat next to where Vaquiz
was sitting. Officer Martin testified that they arrested Vaquiz based on everything they
had personally observed along with everything J.F. had told them, namely that 1) Vaquiz
had distributed heroin to T.L. on January 22, 2016, and 2) Vaquiz had obtained and was
in possession of heroin at the time of his arrest.
A grand jury indicted Vaquiz on two counts for distribution of a controlled
substance and possession with intent to distribute, both in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1). Vaquiz thereafter filed a motion to suppress the 280 bags of heroin seized
during the search incident to arrest on January 29, 2016, arguing that the officers lacked
probable cause to arrest, and thus to search, him. He contended that probable cause was
lacking because it was premised on information learned from an informant that was
unreliable and suspect. After holding a hearing, in which Detective Martin and J.F.
testified, and receiving pre-and post-hearing briefing, the District Court denied the
motion, finding that “the factual record demonstrates that J.F. proved her reliability on
numerous occasions and that the information provided by her was often independently
corroborated by the officers in th[e] case.” App. 18.
Vaquiz proceeded to trial in July 2018. His primary defense was that while he
possessed heroin, it was for personal use, not for sale. During the charge conference, he
requested a jury instruction for the lesser included offense of simple possession under 21
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U.S.C. § 844. The District Court denied the request. The jury issued a guilty verdict for
possession with intent to distribute heroin (Count II). Vaquiz now appeals.
II.
A.

Motion to Suppress

Vaquiz argues that the District Court erred in denying the suppression motion
because the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him, and thus lacked authority to
search his vehicle incident to the arrest. We review the denial of his “motion to suppress
evidence for ‘clear error as to the underlying facts, but exercise plenary review’” over the
legal issues in light of the facts properly found. United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993,
999 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Riddick, 156 F.3d 505, 509 (3d Cir. 1998)).
Under the clearly erroneous standard, we must “‘accept the ultimate factual determination
of the fact-finder unless that determination either (1) is completely devoid of minimum
evidentiary support displaying some hue of credibility, or (2) bears no rational
relationship to the supportive evidentiary data.’” DiFederico v. Rolm Co., 201 F.3d 200,
208 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
A warrantless arrest is permissible provided there exists “probable cause to believe
that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S.
146, 152 (2004). The existence of probable cause “depends upon the reasonable
conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the
arrest.” Id. When the probable cause determination involves statements from a
confidential informant, those statements form part of the totality-of-the-circumstances
analysis. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983). “[I]n making a warrantless arrest an
5

officer ‘may rely upon information received through an informant, rather than upon his
direct observations, so long as the informant’s statement is reasonably corroborated by
other matters within the officer’s knowledge.’” Id. at 242 (citation omitted).
The District Court here found that probable cause to arrest Vaquiz rested on
several factors: the information provided by J.F., the January 22 controlled buy, and the
January 29 controlled buy. Vaquiz contends that probable cause was lacking because, to
the extent it was based on the information J.F. supplied, it was unreliable as she had been
convicted of several crimes for lying. The District Court acknowledged the reliability
issue with J.F., but properly discounted it considering that J.F. had proven her reliability
on several occasions and the information she provided was independently corroborated
by the officers based on their observations and prior knowledge.
As to reliability, Detective Martin testified that he had previously interviewed J.F.
“[h]alf a dozen to a dozen” times and found her reliable and “forthcoming;” he also
testified that she had never lied to him. App. 131. Further, prior to and after each
controlled purchase, the officers “test[ed]” J.F.’s honesty by searching her person and
vehicle for any additional contraband or money and found none. App. 127.
The Court also found that the officers independently corroborated the information
J.F. supplied; for example, when J.F. told them she could buy heroin from “middle man”
T.L. and lead them to a supplier, that information was corroborated by the officers’ own
knowledge that T.L. was a well-known “middle man.” During the January 22 controlled
buy, the officers followed J.F. to a residence that they recognized as belonging to Vaquiz
and personally observed the transaction in which T.L. gave Vaquiz money in return for
6

packets later confirmed to contain a controlled substance. When J.F. came to the officers
with information that Vaquiz was planning to go to Philadelphia on January 29 to
purchase an additional supply of heroin, the officers independently corroborated J.F.’s
information through their own surveillance. Moreover, J.F. was in communication with
Officer Schultz the entire time and did exactly as instructed.
Thus the Court did not clearly err in finding that the officers—considering the
information provided by J.F., their own independent knowledge of Vaquiz as having a
history of drug arrests, and their own independent observations of Vaquiz’s actions from
both the January 22 and January 29 controlled buys—had probable cause to believe that
Vaquiz had committed or was committing a drug offense at the time of his arrest.3
B.

Jury Instruction Request

Vaquiz contends that it was error not to instruct the jury on the lesser-included
offense of simple possession because there was sufficient record evidence to support a
conviction for possession as well as possession with intent to deliver, and thus this failure
to instruct unfairly deprived him of his primary defensive theory—that he possessed the
heroin but never meant to distribute it. We review a district court’s refusal to give a
particular jury instruction for abuse of discretion. United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d
196, 207 n.7 (3d Cir. 2010).

3

To the extent Vaquiz challenges the District Court’s reliance on Detective Martin’s
testimony, which contained hearsay based on Detective Schultz’s statements, a district
court may rely on hearsay evidence during a suppression hearing. See United States v.
Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 679 (1980) (“At a suppression hearing, the court may rely on
hearsay and other evidence, even though that evidence would not be admissible at trial.”).
To the extent Vaquiz challenges the credibility of Detective Schultz, there was nothing to
indicate to the District Court that Schultz was anything but credible in this case.
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Simple possession of a controlled substance, as defined by 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), is a
lesser-included offense of possession with intent to distribute the same controlled
substance. United States v. Lacy, 446 F.3d 448, 454 (3d Cir. 2006). Importantly, “[a]
jury instruction must contain a lesser-included offense only if the evidence adduced at
trial could support a guilty verdict on either charge.” Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Knight,
989 F.2d 619, 632 (3d Cir. 1993). Thus, Vaquiz was entitled to a simple possession
charge only if a rational jury could find that he did not intend to distribute the heroin. Cf.
id. (“Therefore, Knight was entitled to an involuntary manslaughter charge only if a jury
rationally could find that he was not committing a felony at the time the gun
discharged.”).
Despite his personal-use theory, the trial record shows insufficient evidence to
support a conviction for mere simple possession under 21 U.S.C § 844(a). Both J.F. and
T.L testified that Vaquiz was not a heroin user, that he regularly sold heroin, and that he
was the only one in possession of the heroin recovered from the January 29 controlled
buy. The record shows that the amount of heroin recovered from Vaquiz (280 bags on
his person and 28 bags next to where he was sitting), and the way it was packaged (in
small bags for individual resale), are consistent with “strict[] distribution” and “drug
dealer quantity,” not “personal consumption.” Supp. App. 513–15, 528–29. The only
evidence that Vaquiz may have been a user came from Detective Martin’s prior
inconsistent statement at the suppression hearing that Vaquiz was a “user” of heroin. But
at trial Martin denied any personal knowledge that Vaquiz was a user and stated that his
previous statement was a “mistake.” Supp. App. 448–49. Moreover, even under his own
8

theory, Vaquiz’s possession of the heroin and his intent to distribute it to the others would
defeat his argument for a simple possession instruction. Thus the District Court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Vaquiz’s request for the lesser-included-offense
instruction.
*

* *

* *

We affirm the ruling of the District Court.
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